This paper estimates e §ects of exposure to compulsory voting on individuals' political preferences, through a regression discontinuity framework. These results are important to understand e §ects of a voting system transition. The identification comes from Brazil's dual voting system: voluntary and compulsory. Using self-collected data, we find that compulsory voting legislation has sizable e §ects on individuals' political preferences, making them more likely to identify with a political party, to become extreme oriented and to move to the left.
Introduction
This article provides new estimates of the causal voting participation e §ects on individuals' degree of political polarization and political preferences by investigating the impacts of compulsory voting. For identification, we exploit Brazil's dual voting The data come from a self-collected survey of young adults exposed to either system conducted just after the 2010 presidential election in Brazil. In this paper, we quantify the reduced form of the voting e §ect by adopting a sharp regression discontinuity (RD) framework and looking at di §erences around the age of 18. Our estimates show how political preferences among the population change in the transition from a voluntary to a compulsory voting system. They provide inputs to the open debate among academics and society regarding the consequences of a forced democracy (Krasa and Polborn, 2009 ; Krishna and Morgan, 2011) , in place in 31 countries.
Our results are also relevant for other reasons. They allow us to contrast di §erences between eligibility and compulsory in explaining voting e §ects. The causal relationship between voting turnout and political preferences has been documented, but only in the context of voting eligibility. These studies illustrate only part of the voting e §ects. It is plausible that the 1 Stronger sanctions are applied to those who fail to vote in three consecutive elections. They are not allowed to issue or renew their passports and national identity cards and also become ineligible for public education, public jobs, cash transfer programs and credit from financial institutions maintained by the government. 2 Despite that, several studies make cross-country comparisons and document correlations in citizens' behavior under di §erent voting systems. A problem in extrapolating these results, to understand the impacts of the compulsory voting legislation, is that none of the literature consider a potential change in preferences due to forced voting. The data used in this paper is ideal to address this issue. We find that when passing from a voluntary to a compulsory voting system, individuals become more extremely left-wing oriented and become more likely to align to a specific party (PSDB). These results support the findings in Hansford and Gomez (2010) . According to our results, the adoption of compulsory voting legislation would lead to changes in election results, favoring left-wing parties.
Data and Method
The data come from a self-collected survey of 5,559 students in 109 classrooms in eight schools in the city of Sao Paulo (Brazil). Participants are senior high school students, college freshmen or students in the transition between high school and college.
Details related to the data collection and sample characteristics are explained in Leon and Rizzi (forthcoming).
The survey was conducted few days (October 4-7) after the 2010 Brazilian presidential election (October, 3, 2010) . The timing of the data collection is appropriate, as people are likely to think about politics and evaluate their own political views near an election. The compulsory legislation does a §ect citizens. Using these data and an RD approach, as reported in Leon and Rizzi, we find that exposure to the compulsory voting system resulted in a large increase in individuals' voting participation, between 34-40%.
In this article, we ask whether changes in the degree of political polarization and 4 preferences are also observed focusing on the following outcomes. First, we created an indicator for those who answered positively to the survey question: "Do you have a preference for a political party?" Second, we recorded whether a respondent self-declared as being center-oriented (as opposed to moderately or extreme right-or left-wing). Then, we created a polarization index to account for di §erent degrees of polarization. This variable assumes a value of 0 if the respondent declared to be center-oriented, 1 if the respondent declared as moderate and 2 if the respondent declared to be extreme. To understand whether "directional" changes in ideological positioning exist, we constructed a five-point right-wing index coded from -2 (if the respondent declared to be extreme left-wing), -1 (moderate left-wing), 0 (center-oriented), +1 (moderate right-wing) and +2 (right-wing). We also created indicators for whether an individual declared to be extreme-oriented to the left and to the right, as well as the specific party of preference.
We focused on the preference for three political parties, PSDB, PT and PV, because 89.3% of participants with a party preference were aligned with one of them. We focused on a sample of 3,027 students who were between 16.75 and 19.25 years old by the 2010 Election Day (su¢ciently close to the cuto §). Table 1 describes the outcomes by voting participation status.
T able1
We find that voters are more polarized (less likely to be center-oriented and more likely to prefer a political party) than non-voters. They are also more likely to assert a preference for the PSDB and PT parties. These di §erences can cause and/or be caused by voting. To overcome this endogeneity issue and estimate the causal e §ects of turnout participation, we use an RD framework comparing individuals whose ages are around the 18-year-old threshold. Following guidelines from Lee and Lemieux (2010), we estimate the following equation:
where, y i represents the outcome of individual i; X i contains a number of covariates (indicators for gender, race and mother education, and for whether the individual has voted before),  are school fixed e §ects, 1(age = 18) is a dummy indicating whether the student had turned 18 by the 2010 election, M (age) is a polynomial in age (measured by the distance in days to the 18th birthday) that is flexible on each side of the cuto §, and u i is the error term. Table 2 presents OLS estimates for coe¢cient . Each entry in columns 2-4 represents results from a separate regression. These are our estimates for the e §ect of exposure to the compulsory voting system. Following Lee and Lemieux (2010), we present results for several age polynomials and for the optimal age polynomial according to the Akaike criteria.
Results
In the first and second rows, we report results using as dependent variable an indicator for whether the individual self-declared to be center-oriented and for the polarization index, respectively. The estimates do not reveal any discontinuity around the 18-year threshold. The estimated coe¢cients for any of the tested specifications are not statistically significant (p-value> 25%). In the third row, we report results for preference for a political party and find some evidence of an e §ect. The coe¢cient is statistically significant at the 5% level, but only for the specification controlling for a quadratic age polynomial. In this case, the coe¢cient indicates an increase in this likelihood of 9.83 percentage points (or 34%) at the 18-year threshold.
In rows (4)- (9), we look for whether exposure to compulsory voting leads to directional e §ects on ideological positioning. We find evidence that it does, as shown in Table 2 , rows 4, 5 and 7. Estimates in row 5 indicate that individuals become significantly more likely to self-declare to be extreme left-wing (between 2 and 4 percentage points). Row 7 shows that compulsory voting leads to an increase in the likelihood of asserting a preference for the PSDB party (by 5 to 8.6 percentage points). In resultsnot shown in this paper, we find that these directional results (in rows 4, 5 and 7) are also robust to local linear regressions using di §erent bandwidths.
In summary, findings in Table 2 It is important to put our estimated e §ects in perspective. Although present, they are somewhat modest in terms of changing the ideological composition among the population. For instance, most participants younger than 18 years old (under voluntary voting) in our data are center-oriented (64.4%) and this fraction does not change among the slightly older. These timid e §ects might be only a short-term facet of the consequences of compulsory voting. Hence, investigating long-term and permanent e §ects of forced voting is important and awaits future research.
All
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( 1 ) Notes: Robust standard errors are in brackets and optimal age polynomial order based on an Akaike criterion is in parenthesis. All regressions include school-fixed effects and an indicator for whether an individual has voted before. Demographic controls include dummies for gender, race and mothers' education. *Significant at the 10 percent level, **Significant at the 5 percent level. 
